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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the wage formation process In Spain, 
taking into account the effect of the institutional change caused 
by the creation of low-firtng-cost, fixed-term labor contracts. An 
insider-outsider model which assumes that the interests· of workers 
under these contracts are disregard.ed In wage bargains I s  set up 
and tested. The estimation of a wage equation for a sample of large 
Spanish manufacturing firms yields an est imate of the insider 
weight and confirms that an increase In the proportion of 
fixed-term employees increases insiders' wages. 
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1. Introduction 
The unemployment rate in Spain was the highest in the OECD in 
the 1980s, and it s t i l l  hovers around 17X nowadays. Recent 
estimates put the non-accelerat ing inf lation rate of unemployment 
(NAIRU) around 15Y. (De Lamo and Dolado. 1991 ) .  This persistence 
reveals the structural nature of the problem, so that labor supply 
issues in general, and wages in particular, must play a key role in 
any attempted explanation of the Spanish unemployment experience. 
An important result from the previous two Chelwood Gate 
conference papers on Spain1 was that large wage hikes were the main 
factor behind the rise in unemployment in the 1970s, but that in 
the f irst half of the 1980s the blame should fall much more on 
contractionary aggregate demand policies, since real wage growth 
was quite moderate. 
From 1985 to 1990 the unemployment rate fell by 5 percentage 
paints, as employment grew by 3% per year. Apart from a strong 
surge in aggregate demand, this good performance was helped by low 
real wage growth, at least in the f irst few years. This can be 
better understood with reference to the recent evolution of the 
wage drift, i . e .  the difference between the rates of growth of wage 
rates agreed in collective bargains and of average earnings. In the 
1980s wage drift used to be around 2 percentage points but since 
1987 it has been abnormally low ( see Figure 1 ) ,  while at the same 
time, bargained wage rates have been abnormally high in real terms 
1 Dolado. Malo de Molina. and Zabalza ( 1986) and Andres et a1-
( 1990 ) .  
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(see Figure 2 ) . 2 
Understanding these facts is crucial for predict ing whether 
future wage growth will be compatible with further reductions in 
unemployment. In this respect ,  any r igorous analysis must take into 
account the institutional change occurred in 1984, when the Spanish 
government created new f ixed-term labor contracts,  which can be 
signed for short periods and bear low f iring costs. These contracts 
have been used very widely and now comprise around a third of all 
employees .  This change has strongly affected most key variables in 
the Spanish labor market,  including wages. For example, the 
exist ing evidence reveals that permanent workers appear to enjoy 
higher wages than temporary workers (Jimeno and Toharia, 1991a, and 
Alba, 199 1 ), 
In this paper we focus on the relationship between f ixed-term 
contracts and wage growth, from a microeconomic perspective. Our 
model has both theoretical and empirical impl ications, so that,  
besides helping to explain the Span ish experience, i t  might be 
relevant for o ther countries. Let us first sketch the theoretical 
framework, and then come back to its app l ication to the case of 
Spain. 
Wage sett ing in Europe is widely seen today as dominated by 
i nsider employees. that is,  incumbent workers whose jobs are 
protected ei ther by substantial labor turnover costs o r  by the 
2 Bargained wages refer to industry and services, while average 
earnings are for the who le economy. Source :  Garc ia Perea (1992 ) .  
Similar patterns are found in both the data in Albarracin and 
Artola ( 1 990 ) ,  which correct offic ial data for lack of updating of 
employment composition. and in unpublished, more homogeneous data 
referred to in Banco de Espana ( 1992, p. 1 8 ) .  
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possession of specific skills which are necessary in the production 
process. 3 Insiders are assumed to maximize the rents extracted from 
the wage bargain with employers, so that their wages depend both on 
their bargaining power and the firm's performance, the so-called 
inside factors, and on general conditions affecting their expected 
alternative income, the so-called outside factors. The relative 
importance of each kind of factor in each firm is a key determinant 
of wages. 
Also. insiders are defined in contrast to unemployed 
outsiders. who do not participate in the wage bargain. Within the 
insider-outsider framework it is common (see Layard et al.. 1991, 
chapter 2) to equate insiders with last period employees of the 
firm. These are assumed to take into account their own interests 
solely when bargaining. This assumption is a special case of a more 
general membership rule in which some of the outsiders (like 
recently dismissed employees) would be considered in the insiders' 
objective function. In this setup, unemployment persistence can 
arise both through the operation of these dynamic rules, i. e. 
insider or membership hysteresis (Blanchard and Summers, 1986), and 
through the influence of unemployment dynamics on the wage bargain, 
i. e. outsider hysteresis (Layard and Nickell, 1987). 
We believe that the insider-outsider framework is applicable 
to the Spanish wage-setting process, but we submit that the insider 
group may be even smaller than the number of employees in the 
previous period or, more generally. that not all employees may be 
equally weighted in the insiders' objecti ve function. This 
3 Lindbeck and Snower (1988b) contains the series of papers in 
which they started the insider-outsider approach. 
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hypothesis is not new and has already been considered, for example, 
in the median voter model with layoffs by seniority (see Oswald, 
1987 ) .  What we do here is to specialize such framework to the case 
of a two-tier labor market .  which currently prevails in Spain. 
The second tier in that market consists of fixed-term (or 
temporary) employees, who are subject to a h igh Job turnover and 
thus have an unstable attachment to the firm. Th is leads us to 
believe that they do no t participate in the wage bargain on equal 
footing with permanent employees. In fact. we make the extreme 
assumpt ion that temporary employees' interests are completely 
disregarded in wage bargains. To formalize this idea we write down 
a modified model of insider wage setting. in wh ich permanent 
employees are the insiders and temporary workers are outsiders. In 
this mode l .  the impact of the proportion of temporary employment on 
wages is threefo ld: (a) a buffer effect (arising from the knowledge 
by insider permanent workers that temporary employees would be the 
first ones to be dismissed4 ) .  (b)  a compos i t ion effect ( stemming 
from the potent ial difference between permanent and transitory 
workers' wages ) ,  and ( c )  a bargaining effect (arising from the 
potent ial influence of the fixed-term proportion on insiders' 
bargaining power ) .  
Two wide sets of implications of the model are empirically 
studied. The first Is the assessment of the importance of inside 
4 Th is may seem counterfactual.  since over the quarters 
1990:3-1991 : 4  ( i . e. outside our sample period ) ,  permanent 
employment fel l  by a yearly rate of 2.Sy' wh ile temporary employment 
grew by 8. 4Y. .  These are, however, net figures. Lacking data on 
gross flows. we can only point to the huge number of fixed-term 
contracts per net job change observed (see section 2) as evidence 
of a very large turnover of temporary employees. 
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factors in wage setting in Spain. This has already been done at the 
sectoral level (by Andres and Garcia, 199 1 )  but not at the firm 
level,
S 
which is the best suited to the model. We estimate a wage 
equation using panel data on a set of 1 , 167 private, manufacturing, 
and mainly large firms which reported to the Bank of Spain's 
Balance Sheet Survey (Central de Balances del Banco de Espana) , for 
the period 1985-88. Our estimate of the so-called insider weight is 
small, around 1 1re ,  which is similar to the estimates for some other 
countries and also for Spain at the sectoral level. We also find 
some sectoral variation in this coefficient. As to hysteresis 
effects, we obtain strong evidence of membership but not of 
outsider hysteresis. 
The second set of issues we address is the impact of the 
proportion of fixed-term employment on wage growth. We test, and 
are not able to reject, the hypothesis that temporary workers can 
be considered as outsiders, which confirms the presence of a buffer 
effect .  We also separately identify the compos i t ion and the 
bargaining effects mentioned above, finding that the latter is 
posi tive. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 
we briefly describe the structure of wage setting in Spain, the 
nature and evolution of fixed-term contracts and the existing 
evidence on their impact on key variables in the Spanish labor 
market. Section 3 contains a model of insider wage setting with two 
types of workers. Section 4 presents the estimation of the model 
and Section 5 provides our conclusions. 
5 The only exception is the recent work by Draper ( 1992 ) .  
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2. Vage setting and fixed-term contracts in Spain 
The current wage bargaining system is quite new. Although 
collective bargaining existed before, unions were not legally 
recognized until 1977. There are two main unions, which comprise 
around 70Y. of all representatives bargaining with employers. Union 
affiliation is low, around 10Y., but this is a poor measure of union 
power because most industry-wide agreements apply to all firms 
wi thin the sector. Over our sample period, 1983-88, 4, 000 
agreements per year were officially registered. Those corresponding 
to a single firm are concentrated in large firms and comprise abo�t 
20Y. of workers covered by collective bargains. Agreements are 
signed yearly. The object of the bargain is normally wages and 
hours of work; there are often clauses on union representation but 
hardly ever on employment levels. (See Jimeno and Toharia, 1991b, 
chapter 3, for details. ) 
It appears, therefore. that the right-to-manage model we use 
below -in which unions and firms bargain about wages and let the 
firm choose employrnent- is a good enough approximation to reality, 
at least for large firms, which are a majority in our database, and 
especially after 1986, when nationwide wage agreements ceased to 
exist. 
The other aspect we focus on is the change in the 
institutional setting brought about by fixed-term contracts. These 
contracts can be used in any type of activity (temporary in nature 
or not), they can be signed for short periods (previously 6 months, 
1 year since April 1992) and can be renewed up to three years, have 
6 low firing costs, and, contrary to permanent contracts, their 
6 Some types bear no firing costs at all. Other types imply 12 days 
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extinc t ion does not require administrative approval and cannot be 
appealed to labor courts. 
The introduction of these contracts shortly preceded the boom 
experienced over the period 1986-90 -in which GOP grew by 5Y. on 
average- and they were extensively used. Over those 5 years total 
employment increased by 3Y. per year . the number of employees by 
4. SY.. and 98Y. of all contracts registered at employment offices 
were fixed-term. As a result these contracts now cover one third of 
all employees. and 38Y. in the private sector . The proportion of 
this type of contract var ies across workers and sectors. They are 
more prevalent for women than for men (34Y. vs. 28Y. ) .  for young 
workers ( 78r. for those aged 16-19), for less educated workers (36r. 
for i l l iterates, 17Y. for college graduates ) ,  in agr icul ture and 
construc tion (51X and 54Y.) and in Southern regions ( e .  g .  45Y. in 
Murc i a ) .  ( In 1990: 2, when the average temporary employment ratio 
was 30Y. . )7 
Such a change in the structure of labor contracts should 
affect most key labor market variables. For example, the lower 
firing costs entailed by these contracts should induce an increase 
in the cyc l ical var iability of employment.  This is what Bentolila 
and Saint-Paul ( 1992) have found in a sample of large manufacturing 
firms (almost the same one we use here), also est imating an 
increase in employment of 1 . 5  percentage points over three years 
( in which employment actually fell in the sample) due to the 
of wages per year of service versus 20 days for permanent employees 
or 45 days if the dismissal Is ruled unfair. 
7 See Segura et a1. ( 1991 ) or Jimeno and Tohar la ( 1991b ) .  chapter 
4, for more details.  
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introduction of fixed-term contracts. 
The second impor tant effect of fixed-term contracts has been 
an increase in labor turnover . In 1991 there were 5 m i l l ion 
contracts signed, while in net terms 25 thousand dependent jobs 
were being destroyed. The higher turnover may affect productivity, 
for several reasons discussed in the next section. For a sample o f  
large firms i n  1989, Alba ( 1991 ) finds a negative or nul l effect o f  
the proportion o f  temporary employees o n  labor productivity, but a 
positive effect o f  the flow of temporary contracts in newly hired 
workers.  Jimeno and Tohar ia ( 1991a) find a negative effect of the 
proportion of fixed-term employment on sectoral labor productivity 
growth in 1988, but not in 1989. However, Hernando and Valles 
( 1992) do not find any influence of temporary employment on total 
factor productivity dur ing 1986-89. These findings point towards a 
negative correlat ion between the capital-labor ratio and the 
8 proportion o f  temporary employment, which is quite sensible. 
Another consequence of high labor turnover has been a 
disequil ibrium in public finances. Since workers had the r ight to 
collect unemployment benefits after having worked for just 6 
months, the revenues of the unemployment compensation system fell 
short o f  benefit payments as soon as the economy slowed down 
(second half of 1990 ) .  In response, the government raised ( in Apr i l  
1992) the minimum period o f  previous work to be eligible for 
unemployment benefits to 1 year and lowered the amount of 
unemployment benefits, causing some labor unrest. 
8 This is straightforward from the definition of total factor 
product lvl ty. 
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I t  has also been found that workers on fixed-term contracts 
tend to receive lower wages than those on permanent contracts. 9 
Jimeno and Tohar ia ( 1991a) estimate the wage premium in favor of 
the latter, after a wide set of observable character istics is 
controi led for, at about IIY.. This is consistent with the previous 
remarks about the evolution of the wage drift. Nevertheless, the 
lower employment security enjoyed by temporary employees implies 
that they should be compensated through higher, not lower, wages. 
The estimated negative premium for temporary employees might be due 
to unobservable character istics ( this is Alba' s, 1991, reading of 
the datal , but we believe i t  Is more likely due to their low power 
in wage bargains. Again, their unstable attachment to the firm 
makes them much less likely to be part of the workers' bargaining 
uni t .  In the model presented below we assume that these workers'  
10 interests are not represented at all in wage bargains. We think 
this is plausible in manufacturing, but much less in the 
construction sector or even in services, where the propor tion of 
fixed-term employment is so high that such employees must surely 
count in wage bargains. 
9 Discrimination based on contract type is i l legal in Spain, but 
apparently employers are relat ively free to choose the occupation 
in which they classify new workers, so that by underclassifying 
them they can actually pay them less. 
10 This should not be thought of as arising from the law: regardless 
of his/her contract type, any worker with six-months seniority can 
be elected as a workers' representative and any worker with 
one-month senior ity can vote. 
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3. The model 
According to the insider-outsider theory, wages are the 
outcome o f  a bargaining process whereby firms and their insiders 
share the economic rent from insider employment. In this context, 
the insiders' wages will  be higher, ceteris paribus, the more the 
firm stands to lose from a breakdown in wage negotiations. To 
i l lustrate this theory we draw on Nickell and Wadhwani ( 1 990> , 
sl ightly amended to highl ight the theme that permanent workers are 
the insiders. In Lindbeck and Snower ( 1 988a) new workers are called 
entrants and gain the insider status after one period in the firm. 
Although our model is similar to theirs, strictly speaking we do 
not follow this path, since the probabil ity of becoming a permanent 
employee appears to be very low in Spain, between 10% (Segura et 
aJ. , 1991l and 15" (Alba, 1991 ) .  
Fol lowing the convention in this l iterature, the model has two 
parts. The first part describes the behavior of a representative 
imperfectly competitive firm which sets price, production, and 
employment levels given wages and expected demand. The second part 
deals with wage determination in the context of the 
insider-outsider theory wi th two types of labo r .  These decisions 
are made in two stages. First, wages are set according to the 
right-to-manage model (see Nicke l l  and Andrews , 1983) by which the 
firm and workers bargain over wages,  taking the expected effect of 
this decision on prices, production, and employment into account. 
Then the firm sets the previous variables taking wages are given. 1 1  
1 1  
Our model i s  static. Since the power o f  insiders stems 
essentially from adjustment costs, we should have a dynamic model .  
This i s  an extension we leave for further research. 
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3.1 The Firm 
Let there be a representative monopolistic firm, producing a 
homogeneous product with a Cobb-Douglas technology in two types of 
labor: 
y ex + r < 1 ( 1 ) 
where Y is output , N is permanent employment ,  NT Is temporary - p 
employment ,  and A is a technical progress coefficient. Note that 
other factors of produc t ion could be included in A. 
We can think of many reasons why the intensities of permanent 
and temporary labor may differ ( i . e . , why ex differs from r). Three 
are general in nature: temporary workers may be less productive 
than permanent ones because the firm invests less in the formers' 
fi rm-specific human capital, given their shorter expected tenure; 
also temporary workers may devote ei ther less effort than permanent 
ones -in an efficiency wage context- as a result of the pay 
structure established by the firm (as in Rebitzer, 1987, and 
Saint-Paul, 1991 ) ,  or more effort, if they want to show themselves 
as good workers in order to boost their chances of being hired on a 
permanent basis (as in Jimeno and Toharia, 1992 ) .  The other two 
reasons are spec ific to the Spanish experience: over 1985-89 most 
newly employed workers have been less educated and less experienced 
than the average employee (J imeno and Toharia, 1991b, chapter 4 ) .  
Except for one, all of these reasons point towards r being 
lower than ex. The approach we follow in this paper avoids having to 
formalize these ideas explicitly. We just al low for potentially 
different intensi ties for each type of labor. wi thout assuming 
anything about their relative magnitudes. 
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Using the marginal rate of subst itution (MRS) between both 
types of labor, ( 1 )  can be rewri t ten as 
y ( 2 )  
where A = A(T/a.)T, and W p 
workers. The f irst wage is 
and WT are the wages for both types of 
subject to bargaining, while the second 
is taken as exogenous. possibly corresponding to the outsiders' 
reservat ion wage. 
The f irm faces an isoelastic demand curve given by 
y 11 > 1 (3) 
where P is the price of output, Yd is a demand index and c is a 
random variable whose value is revealed only after wage bargaining 
has taken place. The firm maximizes profits. IT. which are equal to 
" p y - W N ( 1  + ria) p p ( 4 )  
where use has been made of the following relat ionship implied by 
the MRS between Np and NT: 
= W N (1 + ria) p p 
From the first order condition of the maximization of ( 4 )  
subject to ( 2 )  and (3). permanent employment i s  given by: 
N 
P 
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1 
l-(a+rlk 
( 5) 
where k ( = 1-1/�) is the degree of market competition and 
- !/1j[I- (cx+a-)kJ 
c=c . Under the assumption, without loss of general i ty. 
that E(c) = 1. expected permanent employment Ne satisfies p 
where. making 
expected real 
N = c Ne p p 
use of ( 3 ) ,  N e p 
wage 
\I I-a-
[ 
Ne p p cx k A 
(6) 
can also be expressed in terms of the 
1 
\I a- r1-tCX+a-Jk T (7)  
pe 
Substituting (7) into ( 4 ) .  it is then easy to show that 
ex-ante maximum profi t  (ne) is given by 
( 8 )  
So. with the Cobb-Douglas production function. the profit 
share in terms of the wage b i l l  of permanent workers is independent 
of WT and is decreasing in both labor intensities. ex and '1. and 
competit iveness, k. 
3.2 The Union 
We assume that insiders are workers with a permanent job, and 
are represented in the bargaining by an organization (for example, 
a works counci l )  which pursues their interests rather than those of 
outsiders, as represented by temporary workers. In particular, the 
bargaining body is assumed to maximize the expected income of the 
median permanent voter, taking WT as exogenous. We will see below 
that,  under the technological assumpt ions made here, the way in 
which WT is determined is not relevant for the empirical 
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formulation of the mode l .  The objective, Vp' is thus given by 
Vp = 5 W + ( 1  - 5 ) W
a 
p p p p 
where 5 is the survival probability (of being employed next p 
period) and wa is the expected income of a laid-off worker given by p 
(1 - � (u) ) we + �(u) B = we [ 1 - � (u) ( 1  - b)]; �'>O ( 9 )  
where � (u)  i s  the probabil ity of unemployment ,  We is 
outside wage, B 1s the unemployment benef it , and b (& 
expected benef i t  replacement ratio. 
the expected 
-e B/W ) I s  the 
If we denote the target employment of the union in the 
bargaining by H, then the survival probabil ity can be written as 
= prob [c 
(W ) p ( 1 0 )  
where S�l' 
the larger 
S' < O. Thus , the probabil ity of survival is smaller p2 
the insiders' target relative to expected employment 
and, therefore, the larger is the wage. In what follows we w i l l  
denote the absolute values of the elastici ties 
to WNe and W as I e I and I e I. respect ively. p p HN SW 
3. 3 The Nash Bargain 
of 5 with respect p 
The bargaining outcome is assumed to be based on the standard 
Nash model with status quo points given by IT = 0 and Vp = w:. So 
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the Nash objective to be maximized is 
(11 ) 
where � measures workers' relative bargaining power. � wi l l  itself 
be a function of a set of variables, among which we can find those 
related to the firm' s likelihood of avoiding bankruptcy arising 
from wage demands or its fi.nancial health ( e . g .  real profits per 
head (bn ) ,  liquidity variables ( ll ,  etc. ) .  
Another variable affecting f3 is the ratio of temporary to 
total employment in the firm (,) . This is the bargaining effect of 
" which comprises two sub-effects with opposite signs. On the one 
hand, there is the so called harassment effect (see Lindbeck and 
Snower, 1988a ) ,  by which insiders may have a stronger bargain ing 
position with the firm by threatening to use uncooperative behavior 
against fixed-term contract employees, in case that their wage 
claims are not accepted by the firm. Under the assumption that the 
smaller the number of insiders ( the higher the proportion ,) the 
more essential they are in the process of production, it is likely 
that by withdrawing cooperation or damaging personal relations with 
temporary workers they wi l l  inflict a higher damage on the firm' s 
position in case of disagreement ,  so that the firm wi l l  prefer to 
accept their wage claims rather than keep the permanent workers' 
positions vacant or replace them by new workers with lower 
12 productivi ty. 
12 Another potential factor by which the proportion of temporary 
employment might affect insiders' power posi tively is the 
accumulation of strike funds over time, as the number of permanent 
employees shrinks. But strike funds seem to be largely absent from 
the Spanish system. so we deem this channel to be irrelevant. 
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On the other hand. there is the discipline effect, by which 
the higher the number of workers under fixed-term contracts the 
lower will be the workers' relative power. since the firm can 
easily lay them off. Temporary workers should be wary of engaging 
in strikes led by permanent employees and this w i l l  tend to reduce 
fl· 
In summary. � can be written as: 
fl = fl(bn, I ,  ¢) (12) 
where fli>O (i = 1,2), and the sign of fl3 will depend on the 
relative strength of the two aforement ioned effect s .  
Differentiating Q in logs with respect to W yields p 
w p Ie I + fll sw o 
From the envelope theorem it is easy to show that 
w 
-
p- = 
ne 
- ex k 
I (ex+,) k 
(13) 
and since I esw I = I eKH I I c .. I, (13) can be expressed in terms of 
the mark up of wages over alternative income as follows: 
w p 
w p 
I-k(ex+,) ( 1 4 )  
The comparative statics of (14) imply that the mark-up o f  the 
-21-
wage of permanent workers with respect to the outside wage is 
higher the greater the union power (�) and the firm's demand (Yd) 
(the latter through its effect on l e
MH I) and the lower the product 
market degree of competition (k), the targeted number of insiders 
(M) and the intensity of both types of labor (a and 7) (the latter 
because more rent is available to extract in the bargaining). 
3.4 Empirical formulation 
On the basis of the dependence of l e
MH I on M/N: and the 
expression for expected labor demand given in (7), it is possible 
to log-linearize (14) so as to explicitly derive the impact of all 
the relevant variables on firm-level wages. Taking the lower-case 
letters, a, m, w, p, and n to represent logs, we have 
Wp = constant + A [ a + p
e + ; (wp-wT) - (I-(a+;) m 
] 
+ 
+ (1-A) [ we - c1 u + c2 b ] + c3 � + k (15) 
where 0:$1\:$1, given the homogeneity 
Jackman Layard and Nickell, 1992, p. 
of W p in W
e and H/Ne (see p 
183) . Thus A represents the 
insider weight. Since a is not observable, we can substitute it out 
using the production function given in (2), implying that the first 
bracketed term in (15) can be rewritten as 
+ ye _ (a + 7) ne - (1-(a+7)) p m 
] 
(16) 
If we now assume that m 
employment is last period's 
expressed as 
= np, -1' 1. e. the targeted level of 
permanent employment, (16) can be 
e - n + (n-n )e + (1-(7+a)) p 
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lin p ] (16' ) 
Denoting the proportion of temporary workers in total 
employment by , (=NylN), we have that np-n � 10g(I-,) � - ,  if 
such a proportion is small, and ( 1 6 )  now reads 
Note that the membership hysteresis term .em and p 
( 16" ) 
the 
proportion • appear as a consequence of the assumption that 
permanent workers are the insiders, and also that the way in which 
WT is determined is irrelevant, given the MRS condition derived 
from the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Finally, it is important to notice that, due to lack of 
information, our wage data correspond to the average labor cost per 
employee in each firm and not to the wage earned by permanent 
workers. This is not a problem, since the aggregate average wage is 
given by 
\I 
which in logs can be approximated by 
w w - . + constant p ( 1 7 )  
Thus given ( 16" ) ,  ( 1 7 ) ,  and a linear approximation o f  ( 12 ), we 
are able to write the log-linear approximation of ( 1 4 )  in terms of 
the average wage, w, as 
w = constant + A [ (p + y - n)e + (l-(<<+r» dnp
e
] + 
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(18) 
This equation has the standard property that bargained wages 
are a convex combination of inside factors relating to the firm's 
ability to pay {(p+y_n)e. k) and the size and strength of the union 
(�p' �); and outside factors affecting the firm's ability to 
control its workforce (w, U, b). 
The distinctive feature of equation (18) relative to other 
empirical specifications in this class of wage determination models 
(cf. Nickell and Wadhwani, 1990 ) is the role played by �n and�. p 
The first variable Just arises from the definition of insiders. 
1. e. M = N l' If it were the case that the bargaining unit also p,-
included a proportion (T) of the temporary workers in their 
employment target for period. t, 1 .  e. M = 
assuming that the product T�_l is small, we 
N p,-l 
would 
+ TNr,_l' then, 
have. in logs, m 
- - -1 
QI np, _l + T¢_l' where '-1 = </;_1(1-'_1) . Thus the new equation 
would be identical to (18), except that �-1 should appear 
significantly, with a negative sign, in equation (18), once the 
current value of </; has been controlled for. Since the coefficient 
of Y is identified, we could estimate the proportion of temporary 
workers in the insiders' target. An estimate for T lower than unity 
would imply the presence of the buffer effect .  
The second variable. ¢, appears in two ways. First, through 
having total labor productivity instead of that of permanent 
workers, as in (16'). This is the composi t ion effect which stems 
from the fact that wages are not the same for both types of 
workers. Second, through its strategic effect on �, the bargaining 
effect .  Note from (17) and (18) that 
with respect to � is given by (c33+A), 
depend upon the relative strength 
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the (semi )elastici ty of wp 
where the sign of c33 will 
of the harassment effect 
(positive) to the discipline effect (negative). Note that if both 
effects' sizes dld exactly compensate each other c33 would be zero. 
If this second effect were negligible, then the coefficient of ¢ In 
the equation for w would be identical, with opposite sign, to the 
coefficient of w, a testable implication of the model. 
4. Data, estimation and results 
4.1 Empirical specification 
Having obtained an empirical log-linear specification of the 
basic wage equation In the previous section, we also allow for the 
lagged dependent variable to enter, for various potentially 
relevant reasons: the existence of long-term contracts, the concern 
of the bargaining unit with both wage changes and wage levels. and 
the long-run nature of the relationship between the wage bills of 
permanent and temporary employees, which is based upon the MRS 
(which justifies equation (4)). Thus. the equation we wish to 
estimate is: 
Wit= a. + al Wit_I + aZ (p+y-n) it + a3 lin pit + a4 wt + as ut + a6 bt 1 
+ a7 kjt + as bnit + a9 lit + alD "'it + all �it-I + Cit (19) 
where i = I, . . .  ,N and t = 1, . . .  , T. 
So the ( 1 ,  t) subscript denotes the i-th firm in period t; (Xi 
denotes a firm-specific fixed effect which controls for all 
proportional differences in skill levels, production technologies, 
etc. that remain fixed over time; j refers to industry; and we 
Z assume that Cit is distributed n. i. d. (0 ,  (Tel. 
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The hypotheses of interest (HO) are the following: homogenei ty 
in inside and outside factors (h): a full bu.ffer effect, 1. e. 
exclusion of temporary workers in the bargaining unit's employment 
target (b�); and no bargaining effect I 1. e. no influence of the 
temporary employment ratio on the relative power of the bargaining 
unit (nb). They can be represented as follows: 
�: at + a2 + a4 = 1; Hbe. 0 o . all = ; 
The definitions of the actual variables used in estimating 
13 equation (19) are: Wit is the average labor cost per employee; 
{p+y-n)it is the value of sales per employee: anpit is the rate of 
change of permanent employment; wt is the alternative wage, as 
measured by average labor cost in industry and services; ut is the 
national unemployment rate (in order to capture composition effects 
we also included the proportion of long-term unemployed in some of 
the regressions); bt is the replacement ratio: kjt is the market 
concentration index (the percentage of sales of either the five 
14 (cS) or ten (cIa) largest firms in each sector) ; and bnit is the 
level of after-tax profits per employee. 
Lastly. lit represents liquidity and financial variables. We 
used a variety of proxies, following similar studies (e. g. 
Wadhwani. 1987, Nickell and Wadhwani, 1989 and 1990, or 
Blanchflower. Oswald and Garrett, 1990). Specifically, we tried: 
(al rdit= interest bill-debt ratio; (bl dcit= debt-capital ratio 
13 Throughout n stands for employment. We intend to estimate 
alternatively with hours of work in the next version of this paper. 
14 Note that, to save notation, here k denotes the inverse of the 
degree of competition in the market. 
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( indicator of insolvency); (c) mld i t= percentage of medium- and 
long- term debt; (d ) bd it = percentage of debt with banks; and ( e) 
al i t= quick assets ratio ( current assets less stocks/current 
l1abil1 t ie s ) .  
4.2 The data 
OUr data come from the accounts of 1, 167 manufacturing, 
non-energy, private firms over the period 1983-88. The source is 
the database of balance sheet records kept at the Bank: of Spain. 
Not a l l  firms in the original sample could be used; both the 
details of the selection process and the precise definitions of the 
variables are in the Append ix. Our final sample represents around 
13. 5% of total manufacturing employment in Spain in that period . 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on some of these 
variables. These are firms: ( a )  which are mainly large, (b)  whose 
employment fell  more than manufacturing employment, ( c) whose sales 
grew more than average; (d ) with less temporary workers than 
average ( in 1988 the manufacturing average temporary ratio was 
18. 3%, vs. 9% in our sample) , and ( e )  paying higher wages than 
average. These differences mean that, at the very least, we should 
be wary of extrapolating our results to the whole manufacturing 
sector. 
4.3 Est i mation method 
Equation ( 1 9 )  is estimated using the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) technique due to Arel lano and Bond ( 1991 ) , 15 which is 
1 5  With their DPD program (Arellano and Bond , 1988 ) .  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 1 
Std. Avg. Avg. ann. 
Mean dey. Max. Min. value growth 00 
1983 Sample Manuf. 
( a )  Firm-level data: 
Levels: 
Total employment 314 1004 21718 2 326 -0. 9 -0. 2 
Permanent employment 300 997 21694 1 317 -1 . 9 
Temporary employment 15 43 914 0 9 22. 0 
Labor3cost p/empl.
2 21  8 1 19 3 16 9. 6 9. 0 
Sales 41 164 4619 10 28 14. 0 12. 4 
Ratios (Yo) : 
Temporary employment 6. 6 12. 9 94. 1 0. 0 4. 6 4 .  7 
Concentration index4 19. 5 12. 2  99. 2 5 . 5  19 . 7  0. 5 
Med . / long term debt 14. 0 19. 0 99. 8 0. 0 6 . 2 52. 4 
(b)  Economy-wide data: 
Mean Growth 1983 
rate value 
Labor costS 17. 0 9. 0 14. 0 
Long-term unempl.  6 62. 5 4.5 57. 3 
Unemployment rate 20. 0 2.2 17. 3 
Replacement ratio 54. 0 -3. 0 54. 7 
Notes: 
1 1983-88 data unless otherwise noted . Monetary figures at 1991 
peseta-dollar exchange rates. 
2 In thousand dollars. 
3 In mil lion dol lars. 
4 Percentage of sales correspond ing to largest 5 firms in the 
sector. 
5 Average labor cost in manufactur ing and services in thousand 
dol lars.  
6 Unemployed for more than a year as percentage of total 
unemployment. 
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a more efficient extension of the traditional instrumental 
variables ( IV )  method suggested by Anderson and Hsiao ( 1982 ) .  Fixed 
effects, ai ' are eliminated by transforming the corresponding 
equation into first difference form. Thus, under the assumption 
that Ci t  is white noise, the resul ting error now has an MAO) 
structure and is correlated wi th the lagged dependent variable, 
requiring instruments ( to be dated at t-2 ) for those variables 
which are not assumed to be strictly exogenous. Of course, the 
validity of the instruments depends on the previous assumption that 
the errors in the equation in levels are serially uncorrelated, 
which can be tested by means of the m2 statistic for the absence of 
second-order serial corr,elation in the differenced equation. 
Arellano and Bond ( 1991 )  show that the limiting distribution of m2 
is a standardized normal variate. We also report the Sargan 
statistic for the validity of the (over ) 1dentifying restrictions, 
SlY' Its limiting distribution is chi-square with (m-k )  degrees of 
freedom, where m is the number of instruments and k that of 
regressors in the equation. 
In the estimation, the variables wit-1 , (p+n-y) i t '  
tl.npit ' and 
'i t  are treated as endogenous, whereas the remaining variables wi th 
f.irm or sectoral variation are lagged one period and treated as 
strictly exogenous. An extended set of instruments is used, 
consisting of all lags of Wi ' ni , (p+y-n)i ' and <Pi from t-2 back, 
plus a constant, the exogenous variables in the equation, and rdi , 
dci , mIdi and ali lagged once, making a total of fifty-two 
instruments. A reduced instrument set consisting of thirty-five 
instruments, selected from the most significant regressors in the 
reduced form equations for the instrumented variables, is also 
used, to check on the robustness of the results with respect to the 
choice of instruments. 
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4.4 Main Empirical resu l t s  
Due to lag requirements only the last four years of the sample 
ca� be used for estimation. This makes for a total of 4668 
observations. Our preferred version of equation ( 1 9 )  is given in 
Table 2, column 1 .  Several points are worth noting. 
First, the long-run homogeneity in the inside and outside 
factors has been imposed after 
(�) was tested for and not 
the corresponding null hypothesis 
rejected ( t-ratio 0.36 ) .  The 
estimated insider weight is about 0. 1 1 ,  a value which is in line 
with that estimated by Nickell and Wadhwani ( 1990 ) for the UK 
(0 . 1 1 )  and in between those pertaining to countries where 
bargaining is rather decentralized (Brunello and Wadhwani , 1989, 
report a value of 0. 33 for Japan) or very centralized (Holmlund and 
Zetterberg, 1989. estimate a value of 0. 04 for Sweden ) .  More 
interestingly. our estimate is almost identical to the one obtained 
by Andres and Garcia ( 1 991 ) ,  using equivalent sectoral regressions 
across 89 industry groups of the Spanish Industrial Survey during 
1978-1986. 
Second. the long-run coefficient of the proportion of 
temporary workers in the firm is very significant and equal to 
-0. 65 ,  which is not too far in abso lute value from the outsider 
weight ,  0. 89.  However. 
coefficients (H�b ) i s  
the nul l hypothesis of equality of both 
defini tely rejected ( t-ratio = 3. 29), 
implying that there is a direct effect of such proportion. 4'. on 
the relative power of insiders, � .  Taking into account the 
estimated value of A and the difference between the previous two 
values ( c33 = 0 . 89-0. 65 ) ,  the long-run (semi ) elasticity of wp wi th 
respect to � is 0.34. so that an increase of , of one percentage 
point ( e .  g. from 6Y. to 7Y.) raises the growth rate of permanent 
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Table 2: Wage equation (19) 
(Dependent variable: wi t ) 
(ll ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  ( 5 )  
Preferred Time Sectoral Reduced Altern. 
specification dummies dummies IV set Insiders 
• 
wit_ 1 0.267 0. 245 0 . 244 0 . 250 0. 273 
(8.  14)  ( 5.8l l (8. 52 )  (8. 1 6 )  (7 . 3l l 
• 
(p+y-n) it 0 . 078 
0. 077 0. 072 0. 079 0 . 090 
(2.76) (2 . 42 )  (2. 80 )  (2. 93 )  (2. 93 )  
• 
(mpit 0. 030 0 . 028 0.022 0. 029 -0. 021 
(2. 90) (2. 98 )  (3. 17) (3. 1 5 )  (2 . 76) 
wt 0 . 655 0. 684 0. 671 0. 637 
( - )  (- ) (- ) ( - )  ( - )  
ut -0. 928 -0. 836 -0. 985 
-0. 978 
( 5 . 60 ) ( - )  (4 . 53 )  (6 . 92 )  (6. 07 )  
bt 0. 108 0 . 106 
0 . 1 1 2  0. 1 19 
(3. 82) (- ) (3. 50) (4. 07 )  (4. 37 )  
kjt_1 0. 0 1 1  0 . 015 0. 020 0. 032 
0. 017 
( 1 . 47 )  ( 1 . 60 )  (2. 67) ( 2 . 92 ) ( 1. 1 9 )  
bnit_1 0 . 093 0.110 0. 1 16 0. 088 0 . 092 
(3. 25 )  (3. 62) (3. 68 ) (3.25) (3. 20 ) 
rdi t_ 1 -0. 016 -0. 021 
-0. 012 -0. 018 -0. 006 
( 1 . 5ll ( 1 . 40 )  ( 1 . 1 9 )  ( 1 . 22 )  ( 0 . 78 )  
mldit_1 -0. 034 -0. 033 -0. 034 
-0. 028 -0. 018 
(2. 58 )  (2. 56 )  (2. 60 )  (2. 31 ) ( 1 .  49) 
• 
"' it -0. 477 -0.511 -0. 510 
-0.505 -0. 302 
(8. 68 )  (8. 29) (8 . 40 )  (8. 43 )  ( 2 . 76) 
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Table 2 (continued) 
( 1 )  ( 2 )  ( 3 )  ( 4 )  ( 5 )  
Preferred Time Sectoral Reduced Al tern. 
specif ication dummies dummies IV set Insiders 
m2 1 . 050 0. 586 0 . 166 0. 812 0 . 896 
SlY 39. 13 37. 17 40. 36 27. 43 39.66 
( 42 )  (41 ) (41 ) (25) (42) 
2 0. 58 0. 57 0 . 59 0. 58 0. 60 " 
£ 
Notes: 
- Number of observations In all regressions: 4668. Period: 1985-88. 
- Heteroskedasticity consistent t-ratios in parentheses. 
- A superscript (. ) denotes instrumented variables. 
The "extended" and "reduced" IV sets are described in the main 
text. 
A constant term was initially estimated but was never 
significant. 
- m2 = test for second-order serial correlation In the differenced 
equation. 
Sargan' s test of overidentifying restr ictions (degrees of 
freedom in parentheses), 
- �
2 variance of the residuals (multipl ied by 100). 
£ 
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workers' wages by about one-third of a percentage point. 
Third, the null hypothesis that permanent workers do not care 
about temporary employees when setting their employment targets 
be (Ho ) is not rejected ( t -ratio = 1.13), implying that our choice of 
the former as the insiders is not at odds with the data, i . e. that 
the buffer effect is present. 
Fourth, both the market power measures and the firm-specific 
liquidity effects are by 
individually some of them (k 
no means insignificant, 
and rd ) show weak effects. 
though 
We have 
kept them on the preferred equation on the grounds that they appear 
more significant in other specifications. 
Fifth, 16 the membership hysteresis effec t ,  captured by the 
variable lm , is also well determined and shows a small posi tive p 
coeff icient, again in agreement with the theory. Given that its 
coefficient in (lS) should be ;\(1-(0:+7)), the estimated share of 
both labor factors is 0. 62, a rather sensible value. 
Sixth , outsider effects are correctly signed and strong. In 
this respect it is important to note that due to the shortage of 
degrees of freedom (we can only use four cross-sections ) ,  a priori 
we expec ted badly determined effects for aggregate variables. This 
is not the case, however , for the unemployment rate, the 
replacement ratio, and the outsider wage. 
We have anyway been prevented from introducing some other 
16 Note that the dynamic monopsony model would provide an alternative 
interpretation of the membership hysteresis effect, different from th e 
one derived from the insider-outsider framework. 
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interesting variables with no inter-firm variation. In particular, 
we were interested in the proportion of long-term unemployment ,  as 
a way to capture an outsider hysteresis effect due to the 
composition of the unemployed (Nicke l l ,  1987 ) .  To be able to 
include this variable, wh ich shows up very significant in the 
industry study of Andres and Garcia ( 1991 ) I we formed a composite 
variable with u and b, using the coefficients estimated in the 
preferred equation, and then introduced the proportion of 
unemployed for more than a year. The variable showed up positive, 
as expected, but not significant at all (coefficient = 0 . 36,  
t-ratio = 0. 27) . In fact, Spanish data on unemployment flows do not 
indicate that the long-term unemployed have had unsurmountable 
difficulties in finding jobs. In the case of men, those who have 
got a job come from unemployment rather than from out of the labor 
force. The long-term unemployment trap would predict a rise in the 
proportion of long-term unemployed when employment rises, whereas 
in Spain employment grew in 1985-88 at an average rate of 2. 8y', and 
at the same time that proportion actually fell by 4 percentage 
po ints. Similarly, the inclusion in the equation of unemployment 
changes did no t prove successful. In any case, the shortage of 
cross-sections makes our data set not the best suited for examining 
the influence of such variables and we will no t make a strong case 
about them. 
Columns 2 to 5 in Table 2 report the results of some 
modifications of the preferred equation. In column 2 ,  the aggregate 
variables have been substi tuted by time dummies wh ich capture all 
the aggregate common variation in the data. The results are very 
similar, which is not surprising since the aggregate variables 
( three) were almost playing the role of the dummies ( four) . In 
column 3, we introduce thirteen sectoral dummies in the differenced 
equation, which correspond to sectoral l inear trends in the levels 
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equation. A Wald test for their joint signif icance takes a value of 
x2(13l = 22. 23, marginally insignificant at the five percent level. 
The remaining variables do not change much except the concentration 
ratio, which doubles its value and becomes more significant. 
Conversely. some of the liquidity variables lose significance. 
The relat ive invariance of the results to the introduc t ion of 
sectoral dummies has an interest ing interpretation. A possible 
criticism of the Joint bargaining-composi t i on interpretation given 
to the coeff icient on the variable fJ in equation ( 18) , is that we 
are not explic i t ly controll ing for skill composition of both 
permanent and temporary workers. 17 To the extent that this 
composit ion has changed across sectors and over time ( the latter 
would be captured in the model by changes in the coeff icients a and 
7 in the production func t ion>, some of the est imated coeff icients 
could be biased. By including sectoral dummies intersected with 
t ime dummies in the differenced version of the model ,  we are 
allowing for a raw measure of those differences in pay across 
sectors which have varied over time. The fact that this set of 
dummies is not significant (X2(S2l=63.2l  suggests that skill 
composi tion and the I ike have tended to be stable over the sample 
period. However .  some of the genuine explanatory variables such as 
(p+y-n l ,  
which we 
" and an could be affected by those shifts, an issue to p 
will come back below. 
In column 4, the reduced instrument set is used and the 
results are again very similar. except in the case of the 
17 Blanchf lower, Oswald and Garret ( 1990) estimate, within an 
insider model, separate w�ge setting equations for unskil led, 
semi-ski l led and skilled workers, finding statistically different 
coeff icients in each. 
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concentration ratio, which again increases in size and 
significance. Given that the results also remained fairly invariant 
to slight variations in this reduced IV set, we feel somewhat 
protected against the usual criticism about the lack of 
identification of wage equations containing inside variables (see 
Hanning, 1992). 
Finally, in column 5, we substitute the rate of change of 
permanent employment. 6n • by the growth rate of total employment, p 
6n. in order to examine the robustness of our choice of the insider 
group. wi th respect to the more tradi tional view which associates 
lagged employment. n_1, to the union's employment target in the 
bargaining process. Note that if this were the case, equation 06") 
would become: 
(16 '" ) 
so that the coefficient of 6n would be positive. However, this is 
not what we find, since the estimated coefficient turns out to be 
negative and significant. A similar sign is obtained by Andres and 
Garcia (1991). though they present evidence that a twist in sign 
occurs when lagged employment changes are added to the equation. 
Unfortunately. we cannot test for this possibility due to the lack 
of cross-sections when estimating in differences. Nevertheless, we 
believe it is reasonable to interpret the above result as favorable 
to the hypothesis that permanent employees are the incumbent 
workers. 
4. 5 Further resu l t s  
In this section we present further evidence on the robustness 
and the interpretation of the results in the previous section. We 
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start with parameter stabil ity tests carried out for the 
coefficients of productivity and changes in permanent employment. 
Given the small number of cross-sections available. we compare the 
estimated coefficients of both variables in the periods 1985-86 and 
1987-88, by introducing in the preferred equation ( co lumn 1 )  both 
variables intersected with a dummy variable wh ich takes a value of 
unity for the second period. In order to allow for long-run 
homogeneity in both periods, the f irst variable is introduced as 
« p+y-n) i t-
W
t ) so that its coeff icient ref lects the change in � in 
equation ( 18 )  between both subsamples. The estimated coefficient 
for this variable is -0. 03 ( t-ratio = 1 . 1 2 ) ,  whereas for 
-0 . 01 ( t-ratio = 0. 76 ) .  Thus, the equation seems to 
stable. 
An p 
be 
it is 
quite 
Given that in the second subperiod labor productivity in the 
industrial sector fell by 2 percentage points ( see Hernando and 
Valles, 1992 ) ,  the reduction in the insider weight P d ,  although 
insignificant, offers some weak evidence of asymmetries in the wage 
adjustment: 1 .  e. , ;>. is h igher in good times and thus workers are 
happy to take a wage hike when productivity is high, but less happy 
to take a cut when productivity is low. 
Similarly, we carry out a stability test for the coefficient 
on 41, yielding an estimated increase of 0. 09 ( t-ratio = 2 . 39 ) ,  
signif icant but small.  Given that there are no serious signs of 
lack of stabil ity in the insider weigh t ,  we interpret this 
significant shift as an increase in the coefficient c33, i. e.  a 
rise in the strength of the harassment effect relat ive to the 
discipl ine effect ,  wh ich is compatible with the progressive 
resurgence of a positive wage drift as noted in the introductory 
section. 
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Thus, apart from some signs of a significant but not very 
sizable shift in the coefficient of the proportion of temporary 
workers, the equation seems fairly stable. This result is somewhat 
contradictory with that of Andres and Garcia ( 1 991 ) ,  who f ind 
strong parameter changes for productivity and employment growth 
after 1984, when fixed-term contracts we introduced. However. our 
sample covers a period where this type of contracts have always 
been used and, moreover, they assume that the employment target is 
lagged total employment . 
Next, in o rder to analyze the degree of heterogenei ty we may 
have missed by assuming a fixed-effects specification with common 
coefficients for all variables except for the constant term, we 
have included in the regression the interaction of the main insider 
variables (wi_1 , �npi ' (p+y-n) i ' �i ) with sectoral dummy variables. 
The interacted terms for the first two va_riables are totally 
insignificant both individually and jOintly (�2(24) = 18. 36 ) ,  which 
implies both that the degree of inertia is rather homogeneous and 
that the insider hysteresis effect is rather robust across 
industries, as it happened to be across different samples. However ,  
for the last two variables the interaction terms are only 
marginally insignificant (�2 ( 12 )  = 18.56 for (p+y-n) and �2 ( 1 2 )  = 
20. 72 for � )  and the individual coefficients A and c33, reported in 
the first two columns of Table 3, show some degree of systematic 
variation across the 13 industry groups in our data set. The point 
estimates of the inSider weight show a range of variation which 
goes from 0. 7% (Sector 2: Mineral extraction) to 24% (Sector 4: 
Chemicals). 
An interpretation of the latter differences, proposed by 
Draper ( 1 992 ) ,  classifies sectors into two types: laggard and 
dynamic. In the former (e.  g. Construction materials, Food, 
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Table 3 
!be insider weight, the effect of temporary workers and productivity 
Se,Q 
tor 
1 0.200 
( 1 . 84 )  
2 0 . 007 
( 0 . 64) 
3 0 . 008 
(0. 53 )  
4 0 . 239 
( 2 . 74 )  
5 0. 166 
( 1.97) 
6 0.173 
( 2 . 06 )  
7 0.117 
(2 . 02) 
8 o. 138 
( 2 . 1 2 )  
9 0.075 
( 1 . 67 )  
10 0 . 138 
( 2 . 35 )  
1 1  0 . 173 
( 2 . 62 )  
12 0.147 
(2.33) 
13 0. 195 
(2 . 26) 
0.570 
(3.36) 
0 . 402 
(2.76) 
0. 422 
( 3.01 ) 
0 . 510 
(2. 97 )  
0.545 
(3 . 02) 
0. 298 
( 1.95 ) 
0 . 852 
(4.02) 
-0. 617 
(3. 76 ) 
0.278 
( 2 . 00 )  
0. 415 
(3. 66 ) 
0 . 464 
(3. 27) 
0. 248 
(2.72) 
0 . 556 
( 3 . 86 )  
strikes 
ranking ranking 
2 1 
8 8 
5 9 
4 2 
9 7 
1 4 
12 1 1  
10 10 
7 5 
6 3 
1 1  12 
3 6 
Rank correlation coefficients: 
Produc- Product. A 
• 
tlvlty ranking ranking 
9.5 2 2 
4.1 7 1 3  
4. 2 6 12 
9.6 1 1 
5. 0 4 6 
7.3 3 4 
3. 2 10 10 
4.5 5 9 
3. 1 1 1  1 1  
1 . 7  13 8 
3. 5 9 5 
2.9 12 7 
3. 8 3 
Between c33 and strikes rankings: 
0.80 
(4.20) 
0 . 50 
(2. 00 )  
Notes: 
Between A and productivity growth ranklngs: 
• 
Average growth rate of real labor productivity in 
1984-89. 
Asymptotic t-ratios below parameter estimates and 
correlation coefficients. 
Sources: For the strikes ranking. "Boletin de Estadisticas 
Laborales" . For real labor producti vi ty. Hernando and 
Valles ( 1992 ) .  
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Beverages, and Tobacco ) ,  sheltered from foreign competi tion, wages 
resp9nd l ittle to changes in the f irm' s productivity. In the latter 
( e. g. Chemicals, Automobiles, Other manufacturing), with 
state-of-the-art technology and open to foreign competi tion, wages 
respond to internal condi tions. In Draper ( 1 992), i t  was found in 
equivalent (more aggregated) industry regressions, that the insider 
weight varied across sectors and its variation was somewhat related 
to the degree of openness and compe t i t i on across sectors. Although 
we have not been able to f ind a similar degree of systematic 
variation across our 13 industries, we are able to match both the 
top (sectors 4 and 6 )  and the bottom (sectors 2 and 9 )  of her 
classification. 
Fol lowing up on this hypo thesis, we provide in Table 3 the 
real labor productivity growth by sector (from Hernando and Valles, 
1992 » ) .  The rank correlation between ;\ and the average growth of 
real productivity over 1984-89 is 0. 54 (t-ratio = 2 . 02 ). Th is may 
have a negative effect on employment growth . More specifically, if 
low productivity industries are mainly affected by the al ternative 
wage (relative wage effect) whereas the productivity gains in the 
more dynamic industries feed through partially to wages, the 
process of employment reallocation can be curtailed, since the Job 
destruction in the laggard industries would not match job creation 
in the more productive sectors. 
We also analyze whether there exists any relation between the 
systematic variation found in the coeff icient c33 across industries 
and some of its determinants as captured by the harassment and 
discipl ine effects described in section 3. 3. In order to 
approximate them we have used an industrial strife index, measured 
by the average number of working days lost per employee in each of 
the 1 3  industries ( sector 5 was excluded for lack of data) over the 
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period 1986-89. The intuition behind the use of this index is that, 
although it should not have a clear correlation with the harassment 
effect , i t  should definitely be negatively correlated with the 
discipl ine effect .  Since the latter affects c33 negatively. we 
should expect to find a positive correlation between the industrial 
strife index and c33. For this purpose, we report in Table 3 
Spearman' s correlation between the rankings of both variables. 
wh ich is surprisingly h igh (0. 80) and significant ( t-ratio : 4 . 20 ) .  
Thus, the evidence in this respect turns out to be extremely 
favorable to our hypothesis, and may offer another explanation for 
the progressively wider use of fixed-term contracts, based on the 
potential increased discipl ine they provide. 
Lastly we turn back to the issue of ski l l  composit ion. As we 
mentioned above, the interpretation of the c33 coefficient might be 
mistaken because of the lack of control for ski l l  levels. The 
argument is that since the ski l l  composi tion affects the average 
wage, if the proportion of fixed-term contracts is correlated with 
skill levels and the latter variable is not included in the 
regression, the est imated coefficient in the latter would be 
biased. Therefore, we have performed an informal test of this 
hypothesis. We do not have information on the skill composition 
within firms but we do have a proxy for it by sector. Thus we have 
calculated a ski l l  index equal to the proportion of workers in 
unskil led occupat ions by sector (the details are in the Appendix). 
We computed the ranking of the increase in the proportion of 
f ixed-term employment and of the change in the skill index, both 
from quarter 1987: 2 to 1991: 2 (which does not correspond to our 
sample period, but there is no sectoral data on fixed-term 
contracts before 1987) . The correlation is performed in differences 
instead of in levels, since fixed-term contracts are a new 
phenomenon. The rank correlation is 0 . 12 ( t-ratio = 0. 4 ) ,  i . e. the 
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necessary condition that there be correlation between ski l l s  and 
f ixed-term contracts 1s not satisfied. So we do not worry further 
at this stage about this issue, al though we think it merits future 
addit ional research. 
S. Conclusions 
In this paper we study wage setting in Spain, as a key factor 
in trying to explain this country' s poor unemployment performance 
since the mid 1970s. In doing so we need to take into account the 
institutional change occurred in the mid 1980s, when fixed-ferm 
contracts with low firing costs were established. 
We formalize the wage-setting process wi thin the 
insider-outsider theory. We present a modified model in which 
permanent employees are the insiders and temporary employees are 
considered as outsiders, so that the latter' s interests are not 
taken into account by the former in the wage bargain. Wi thin the 
model ,  the proportion of temporary employment affects wages in 
three main ways. First, it may increase insiders' wage demands if 
they disregard temporary employees' interests, since the latter 
workers would be the first ones to be dismissed, 1. e.  a buffer 
effect .  Second, it has a compos i t ion effect ,  stemming from the fact 
that wages may differ between the two types of workers. Third, i t  
may affect insider ' s bargaining power .  This bargaining effect i s  a 
compos1 te one, since an increase in the proportion of temporary 
employment may raise such power because insiders may threaten to 
wi thdraw cooperation with temporary employees ( the harassment 
effect )  or i t  may lower it because temporary employees are more 
wary of engaging in strikes ( the discipl i ne effec t ) .  
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We test our model using data on a panel of large manufacturing 
Spanish firms for the period 1985-88. We obtain two sets of 
results. On the one hand, we analyze the typical features of 
insider-outsider models: the homogeneity in inside and outside 
factors, predicted by the model, cannot be rejected, and a few 
liquidity and market power variables appear to be marginally 
significant as inside factors, whi le aggregate labor market 
variables come in strongly as significant outside factors. We take 
the significance of financial variables as another reason 
validating our approach of using firm-level data as opposed to 
sectoral data. Also, our estimate of the weight of firm-specific 
factors in wage formation ( the so-called insider weigh t )  is around 
10%, a number close to those found for other countries with similar 
wage bargaining structures, and almost identical to the value 
estimated for aggregate wage sett ing in Spanish manufacturing by 
Andres and Garcia ( 1991 ) .  We also obtain strong evidence of 
membership but not of outSider hysteresis. 
On the other hand, we test the features of our model which are 
more specific of the Spanish experience. First, it cannot be 
rejected that the interests of employees on fixed-term contracts 
are disregarded in the wage bargain ( i . e. , there is a buffer 
effect ) .  We also find evidence of a composi t ion and bargaining 
effects, the latter having a positive sign. This ts probably the 
most striking of our results. We perform a sensitivity analysis on 
the estimated equation, finding that the results are relatively 
robust .  
Lastly, we find some sectoral heterogeneity i n  the insider 
weight. This coefficient appears to be larger in sectors with 
larger productivity growth, whereas outside opportunities (and 
wages in particular) matter more in the case of sectors with lower 
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productivity growth. As noted in the main text, this may hinder 
employment growth, since employment destruction in the latter 
sectors would not be matched with job creation in the former. This 
could be a structural explanation for the difficulties experienced 
in lowering the Spanish unemployment rate. There is also evidence 
of some heterogeneity in the effect of the proportion of temporary 
employment on wages, which seems to arise from its different 
dampening influence on wages across sectors. 
We interpret these results as implying that the 
insider-outsider model is qui te appl icable to the set of Spanish 
firms we have studied. We infer that the flexibi l i ty enhancing 
measures introduced by the Spanish government have created a 
two-tier labor market in which temporary employees have l i ttle say 
on wage formation, at least in the manufacturing sector. The fact 
that permanent employees are protected by a buffer of temporary 
employees may lead to increase their wage demands. Specifically, we 
find that a 1 percentage point increase In the proportion of 
temporary employment raises the growth rate of permanent workers' 
wages by one-third of a percentage point. In order to gauge the 
overal l  impact of the introduction of temporary employment on 
Spanish wages, this effect has to be weighed against the lower 
wages earned by temporary workers and the discipl ining effects they 
seem to have on insiders' bargaining power. 
This appl ication helps us understand the evolution of the wage 
drift we described in the introduction. On the one hand, the 
exist ing empirical evidence of a lower wage for temporary employees 
points towards the shrinking of the wage drift being the 
consequence of the composi t i on effect :  the rapid rise in the 
proportion of temporary employment lowered down computed average 
earnings growth. On the other hand, the net result of the 
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bargaining and buffer effects of temporary employment on bargained 
wage rates may easily have been positive, thus explaining the 
latter ' s unusually large increases. Since the first effect has 
already disappeared (because of the stabilization of the temporary 
employment rat i o ) ,  the other two may prevail in the future and, if 
their net effect is positive, the wage moderation experienced over 
most of the recent boom, 1985-1990, may be over, casting a shadow 
on the prospects for employment growth, and therefore for a 
decrease in unemployment, in the future. 
We leave a set of issues for further research. On the 
theoretical side, we would l ike to build up a truly dynamic model 
arising from adjustment costs. On the empirical side, we want to 
try an al ternative measure of the labor input, in terms of hours 
instead of employees, and of the wage, by using bargained wage 
rates instead of the average labor cost. 
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Appendix: Sampl e  selection. definitions of variables and sectoral 
classification 
A. 1 Sample selection 
We started with a sample of 2 , 445 public and private firms, to 
which we appl ied the following f i l ters (details are in Bentol i la 
and Salnt-Paul , 1992 ) :  ( a )  Total and rlgld employment ,  sales, net 
capital stock, cumulated depreciation and labor costs positive 
every year, (b) Change in permanent employment lower than 0, 75 for 
firms above SO workers, and ( c l  Change in labor productivity 
between -0, 67 and 2. 
Of the remaining 2 , 012 firms, 1 , 214 were private non-energy 
firms belonging to manufacturing ( i . e. with more than 90% of their 
1988 sales in manufacturing goods ) ,  of which 47 were deleted 
because their equity or borrowed funds were nonpositive. 
A. 2 Defini t i on of variables 
Employment :  Average number of employees over the year. For 
fixed-term employees, the average number of workers is multiplied 
by their average number of weeks of work and divided by 52. 
Labor cost per employee: Wages plus social security contributions 
paid by the firm plus other labor costs, divided by employment. 
Productivi ty: Sales divided by employment .  
Concentration ratiO: Sales of 5 and 10 firms with largest market 
shares (Source: Encuesta Industrial, kindly provided by Crist ina 
Maz6n l . 
Profits per employee: After tax account ing profits divided by 
employment. 
Interest rate: Financial costs divided by total debt. This is 
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multiplied by a dummy taking the value of zero if debt or financial 
costs are zero in the current year or if the calculated interest 
rate is larger than SOY.. 
A. 3 Sector defini t i ons and number of firms 
No. Sector CNAE Sector 1 No. of firms 
1 Automobi les 36 38 
2 Mineral extraction 21 -23 29 
3 Construction materials 24 90 
4 Chemicals 25 174 
5 Agricultural and industrial machinery 31-32 217 
6 Office machinery, Electric materials, 
and Electronics 33-35 74 
7 Ship-, train-, and plane-bui lding 37-38 16 
8 Precision and optical instruments 39 4 
9 Food, Beverages, and Tobacco 41-42 180 
10 Text iles, Leather, and Shoes 43-45 161 
1 1  Wood, Pulp, and Paper 46-47 108 
12 Rubber and Plastics 48 60 
13 Other manufacturing 49 16 
CNAE is the Spanish National Classification of Economic 
Activities, at the 2 digit level. 
A. 4 Computat ion of the ski l l  index 
We grouped the 99 occupations in the Spanish National 
Classification of Occupations (Clasificaci6n Nacional de 
Ocupaciones, from the Insti tuto Nacional de Estadistica, revised in 
1979) into 5 groups, ( ! )  white collar skilled, ( 2 )  white collar 
middle skil led and unskilled, ( 3 )  sales people, ( 4 )  blue collar 
skil led and ( 5 )  blue collar unskil led. Our sectoral skill index is 
equal to the sum of employment in groups ( 2 )  and ( 5 )  divided by 
total employment.  The assignment of the 99 groups into the 5 
" sk i l l "  groups is available from the authors upon request. 
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